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  Both the industry and the academia have witnessed the rapid evolution of indoor location-based 
services.  It benefits to produce a great quantity of applications, i.e., asset tracking, indoor positioning 
and navigation, location sharing in different scenarios such malls, hospitals, airports and train stations.  
To achieve location information, diverse indoor localization techniques have attracted considerable 
interest from the research community.  In particular, a large body of indoor localization approaches 
exploit received signal strength (RSS) as a metric for location determination, since they can utilize the 
existing network infrastructures deployed in the indoor environment.  The RSS fingerprint-based 
scheme involves a site survey process, where RSS values at known locations are collected and then 
associated with known physical positions to build the fingerprint database (also termed as radio map) 
that is used for location estimation. 
  However, in real-world cases, it is cost-prohibitive, labour-intensive, and time-consuming to perform 
a site survey for the fingerprint database, which limits the applicable buildings of wireless localization 
worldwide.  Therefore, how to significantly reduce the calibration effort of fingerprint collection is an 
essential research topic in the area of wireless network communications.  In recent years, mobile 
crowdsourcing has been an attractive solution for massive data collection and data processing.  It has a 
merit to leverage the power of mobile users to complete a complex and tedious task.  Thus, extensive 
studies have been conducted to utilize mobile crowdsourcing to reduce the calibration effort of site 
survey by allowing common users to contribute fingerprint data in a participatory sensing manner. 
  The objective of this dissertation is to study the design of incentive mechanism of mobile 
crowdsourcing-empowered data collection that is used in the application of indoor localization.  This 
dissertation consists of two main chapters preceded by an introduction and terminated by conclusions.  
All the chapters are described as follows: 
  Chapter 1 presents an introduction on research background of mobile crowdsourcing-based 
fingerprint data collection.  In addition, this chapter describes the research objectives from the 
perspective of incentive mechanism design, user privacy protection and sensing quality estimation.  
What’s more, this chapter also summarizes the main contributions and gives an overview and structure 
of the dissertation for better understanding. 
  Chapter 2 covers the preliminaries and theories relevant to mechanism design, game theory, as well 
as differential privacy that are necessary to readers, which are used in the future chapters. 
  Firstly, a short introduction of mechanism design is presented, which includes basic theories for 
mechanism design from the perspective of economics, the framework with an example over the 
mechanism design as well as important foundations. 
  Then, the preliminary knowledge on game theory is presented.  Game theory is a promising 
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mathematical tool to analyse the strategic interactions among different players.  In addition, in this 
dissertation, in order to characterize the strategic interactions among the roles in mobile 
crowdsourcing-based systems, Stackelberg game and auction theory are both introduced, as well as 
some relevant examples for these theories are also described for illustrative purpose. 
  Furthermore, the issue of users’ privacy protection that is encountered in mobile 
crowdsourcing-based applications is presented.  To preserve user privacy, the celebrated differential 
privacy together with a special case is explained. 
  Chapter 3 studies the design of incentive mechanism for crowdsourcing-empowered fingerprint data 
collection without sensing quality consideration.  Intuitively, on one hand, the costs to perform this 
crowdsourcing task, such as the battery usage, data rates, and computational resources, are all paid by 
the users.  Therefore, mobile users are reluctant to take part in the mobile crowdsourcing-based 
system unless the satisfied reward can be provided to compensate their costs.  Accordingly, the design 
of incentive mechanism is a critical issue in the field of mobile crowdsourcing-based fingerprint data 
collection for indoor localization, which aims to attract users’ participation.  On the other hand, the 
privacy issue has been one of the major concerns for mobile crowdsourcing-based systems due to that 
mobile users’ contributed data may involve personal sensitive information such as location information, 
identity information and activity record.  If these sensed data are leaked, they will suffer privacy 
threats, which might further limit users’ participation.  To deal with these issues, this chapter is 
concerned on the design of incentive mechanism without sensing quality consideration, which aims to 
attract enough mobile users’ participation, as well as protect the privacy of the sensed data of mobile 
users. 
  Firstly, this chapter presents the definition of indoor trajectory and proposes a trajectory utility 
function to characterize the relation between the length of indoor trajectory and the privacy protection 
achieved by using differential privacy. 
  Secondly, the fixed reward-driven incentive mechanism is proposed under the incomplete 
information scenario that the sensitivity level of the privacy of each mobile user’s data is unknown to 
the platform.  Subsequently, the strategic interactions between the platform and mobile users are 
modelled as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the platform acts the leader and mobile users act as 
the followers.  The objective of this mechanism is to maximize the utilities of the platform and mobile 
users, respectively, where users’ total payment does not violate the fixed reward of the platform. 
  Thirdly, a variable reward-driven incentive mechanism is further devised under the complete 
information scenario that the sensitivity level of the privacy of each user’s data is public to the platform.  
Moreover, a demand function is exploited to characterize the relationship among the platform, mobile 
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users, and service consumers with the goal to reflect the impact of the price fluctuation.  The objective 
of the variable reward-based mechanism is to maximize the profit of the platform. 
  Eventually, the performance of these two incentive mechanisms are assessed by using numerical 
simulations. In particular, the fixed reward-driven incentive mechanism is compared with a 
platform-centric scheme without considering the privacy issue. 
  Chapter 4 studies the design of incentive mechanism with sensing quality consideration.  In practice, 
it is extremely challenging to quantify the sensing quality of the sensed data shared by mobile users 
because of the lack of users’ historical data and ground truth.  Different from Chapter 3, this chapter 
focuses on the incentive mechanism design with sensing quality consideration. 
  Foremost, the metric of sensing quality is proposed to characterize the joint impact of privacy 
protection and the spatial coverage, where local differential privacy is used to protect users’ privacy.  
In addition, given the budget constraint, the sensing quality maximized problem is formulated. 
  Secondly, a non-truthful incentive mechanism under the budget constraint is proposed to maximize 
the sensing quality, where the platform does not know whether mobile users would report their costs 
truthfully.  This formulated problem is then transformed into the classical budgeted maximum 
coverage problem with the goal to prove its NP-hardness.  In the meantime, a greedy-based algorithm 
is proposed to obtain an approximate solution for the budgeted sensing quality maximization problem. 
  Thirdly, in order to maintain the truthfulness of mobile users’ costs, a truthful incentive mechanism 
based on auction theory is proposed, where the platform act as the auctioneer and mobile users are the 
bidders.  In addition, this scheme incorporates the sensing quality into the valuation function of the 
platform and the sensing quality maximized problem is transferred into the maximum valuation 
problem with a budget constraint.  Furthermore, an algorithm is designed to solve this problem, which 
includes the winner selection phase and the payment determination phase.  This auction-driven 
incentive mechanism is theoretically proved to be truthful, budget feasible, individual rational, and 
computationally efficient. 
  In the end, numerical simulations are conducted to evaluate the proposed incentive mechanisms.  
Moreover, extensive experiments based on real-world data are carried out to have an evaluation on the 
non-truthful incentive mechanism, which concern on the impact of the privacy protection and the 
budget on the localization performance, respectively. 
  Finally, Chapter 5 makes the main conclusions of this dissertation, as well as, presents several future 
research directions. 
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